This note is about the possibility of a stalem ate in a continuing conflict. Following the prevailing econom ic literature on the topic, under som e assum ptions, the outcom e of a conflict can be described in two ways: (i) a predeterm ined split of a contested output; (ii) a winner-take-all contest where the winning agent is capable to grab all the contested stake. By contrast, in reality m any disputes do not have a clear or a definite outcom e. A stalem ate can end the conflict with the result of a draw. To allow for a stalem ate, som e form al m odifications to the classical Hirshleifer's m odel of conflict are needed. In particular, the possibility of a stalem ate can be captured through a m odified form of the Contest Success Function as axiom atized by Blavatskyy (20 0 4). Under the possibility of a stalem ate, the scenario exhibits a higher level of 'guns' than Hirshleifer's classical m odel. At the sam e tim e, it also exhibits a lower degree of entropy. J EL CODE: D74, F59, H56, J 52.
In tro d u ctio n
This note is about the possibility of a stalem ate in a continuing conflict. A conflict can be defined as: a destructive interaction w hich involves strategic interdependent decisions in the presence of coercion and anarchy . J ack Hirshleifer pioneered the work on m odeling conflict, whose foundations are in Hirshleifer (1987 Hirshleifer ( , 1988 Hirshleifer ( , and 1989 . The econom ic theory of conflict 1 rests upon the assum ption that agents involved in conflict interactions have to choose an optim al level of resources devoted to the unproductive activity of conflict which is necessarily detrim ental for welfare. The stake of the conflict is interpreted as a joint production which depends on the productive efforts of the agents and the cost function is represented by the foregone production.
Following the prevailing literature, under som e assum ptions the outcom e of a conflict can be described in two ways: (i) a predeterm ined split of the contested output; (ii) a winner-take-all contest where the winning agent is capable to grab all the contested stake. In both cases the outcom e of conflict is definite and have a clear outcome. By contrast, in reality m any disputes do not have a clear or a definite outcom e. A stalem ate can end the conflict with the result of a draw. The occurrence of stalem ates is a com m on feature of international interactions. As can be sim ply verified in the Militarized Interstates Disputes dataset m aintained within the Correlates of War2 project at the Pennsylvania State University 2 , a large part of m ilitarized disputes (40 %) over the period 1816-20 0 1 resulted in a stalem ate. A stalem ate shapes a scenario where there is neither a clear victory of one party nor an effective conflict resolution m echanism .
To allow for a stalem ate som e form al m odifications to the classical Hirshleifer's m odel of conflict are needed. In particular, cornerstone of the econom ic literature on conflict is the Contest Success Function (henceforth CSF for brevity). 3 Therefore, the existence of a stalem ate can be captured through a m odified form of the CSF as axiom atized by Blavatskyy (20 0 4).
The paper is organised as follows: in a first section the Hirshleifer's basic m odel will be expounded. It is slightly m odified with respect to the original version. This does not affect the m ain classical results. In a second section, the classical basic m odel is enriched in order to capture the em ergence of a stalem ate. In a third section, results of the foregoing sections are sim ply com pared in order to highlight the im pact of a possibility of a stalem ate upon the destructiveness of conflict. Eventually the concept of statistical entropy will be applied as a novel m easurem ent tools for conflicts. A final section sum m arizes the results and provides a tentative interpretation of the results.
H IRSH LEIFER'S CLASSICAL MOD EL OF CONFLICT
In the classical Hirshleifer's m odel of continuing conflict two risk-neutral agents indexed by 2 , 1 = i m ake sim ultaneous (à la Nash-Cournot) and once-and-for-all choices about their own allocation of resources between 'butter' and 'guns'. Each agent is endowed with an initial positive endowm ent of resources, ( ) ∞ ∈ , 0 i R , which can be converted into 'guns', or 'butter' according a Resources Partition Equation defined by: ( 2 )
Then, the resources allocated to productive activities determ ine a total contestable output, that is to be distributed according the resources allocated to 'guns'. Let m e assum e that agent 1 has a larger initial endowm ent than agent 2: 2 1 R R > . In particular, for sake of sim plicity I set 1 1 = R whereas agent 2's endowm ent is assum ed to be a fraction ( )
. Eventually the contestable 'pie' becom es:
The outcom e of the conflict is determ ined through a Contest Success Function. It sum m arizes the relevant aspects of what Hirshleifer defines the technology of conflict. In particular, even if the CSF can take different form s, I apply the ratio form of the CSF.
( )
Equation (4) is differentiable and follows the conditions below:
The functional form adopted in equation (4) implies that there is no preponderance of an agent over the other. This is of course a lim iting assum ption, even if m any conflicts fall in this category. Under the assum ption of risk-neutrality the outcom e of the CSF can also denote the proportion of a determ inistic appropriation of the 'pie' going to agent i for 2 , 1 = i . Eventually, the incom e distribution equations for both agents are given by:
The first order conditions for a m axim um are:
The second order conditions are:
Therefore, the optim al allocations to 'guns' in the classical continuing conflict scenario are given by:
Note that -as Hirshleifer noted in his sem inal paper -there will be a critical resource ratio 
And the level of joint production is given by:
( 1 0 ) Eventually, in the interior Nash equilibrium the incom es for agent 1 and agent 2 are:
( ) ( 1 1 ) Sum m arizing, in the classical continuing conflict scenario conflict appears to be as a redistributive activity. The poorer agent will invest m ore in 'guns'. This is the Hirshleifer's argum ent of Paradox of Pow er. The conflict im poses a wastage of resources since that half of the endowm ents are devoted to 'guns' and consequently the size of the 'pie' shrinks.
CONFLICT AN D STALEMATE Hereafter I shall slightly m odify Hirshleifer's basic m odel by m eans of a particular functional form of the CSF. It has been axiom atized by Blavatskyy (20 0 4). This functional from adm its the possibility that a stalem ate can em erge between agents. The CSF takes the following form :
Where the subscripts 's' denote the scenario with the possibility of a stalem ate. The (12) follows the conditions presented in (4.1) but note that the probability of a stalem ate is given by:
( 1 3 ) Hence, the incom e redistribution equations becom e:
( 1 4 ) The first order conditions for a m axim um are: ( 1 7 ) Note that 1 * 1 < g whereas 43 . ( 1 9 ) and the final joint production is given by: ( 2 1 ) It is clear that in the basic m odel 2 / 1 = IV whereas in the presence of a stalem ate it is given by: ; (iii) the range of the N ash interior equilibrium shrinks and there is a larger room for corner solutions at w hich the poorer party invest all its resources in 'guns'.
However, a conflict can be susceptible of further m easurem ent and evaluation. In Caruso (20 0 7a) and Caruso (20 0 7b) I proposed a novel m easurem ent to analyze the realm of conflicts. An appealing idea can be related to those of disorder and random ness. In fact, since conflict is a destructive interaction between two or m ore parties, it seem s reasonable to consider also the degree of uncertainty it spreads. In actual violent appropriative conflicts, uncertainty about the final outcom e does clearly constitute a characteristic elem ent that should be considered in developing devices to solve the conflict itself. In order to capture the degree of uncertainty and disorder I apply the idea of statistical entropy which is com m only adopted in com m unication theory and physical sciences. 4 The fam ous reference is the work of Shannon and Weaver (1949) , which posed the quantitative foundations of inform ation theory. Hence, entropy is defined as: The degree of disorder is given by:
(1/ ,...,1/ ) ln E nn k n = . For instance, in the lim iting case of 2 n = and 1 k = the degree of disorder will be given by ln(2) E = . However, it would also be m ore useful to introduce the concept of relative entropy . Relative entropy is defined as the ratio of the actual to the maxim um entropy in a system . That is, it would be useful to recognize the extent to which the degree of disorder approaches the m axim um level attainable. In form al term s it is possible to write the relative entropy as: /( ) REE L n n = . Then, relative entropy in classical m odel of continuing conflict will exactly reaches its m axim um level, nam ely ( ) δ for com pactness. Note that relative entropy is inversely related to the degree of asym m etry in initial resources endowm ent. Being narrative, the m ore the agents are equal in their initial endowm ents the m ore turbulent appears to be the scenario under the possibility of a stalem ate. To sum m arize:
Proposition 2: Consider a conflict w hen agents are equal in their fighting abilities and the conflict is not decisive. Therefore (i) the conflict under the possibility of a stalem ate appears to be less turbulent than the classical m odel of conflict w here relative entropy reaches its m axim um level; (ii) the degree of turbulence is inversely related w ith the param eter capturing the asy m m etry in the initial endow m ent. The m ore the agents are sim ilar the m ore turbulent appears to be the scenario.
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS AN D INTERPRETATIONS
This brief note was intended to shed light on particular aspect of conflict interactions. The emergence of stalem ate in conflict interactions. In fact, differently from political science the econom ic theory of conflict disregarded the occurrence of a stalem ate. This analysis is grounded upon a particular functional form of CSF as expounded in Blavatskyy (20 0 4). The point of interest is that this kind of scenario exhibits a higher intensity of violence. The rationale should be that agents try to avoid the em ergence of a stalem ate and then increase their own level of 'guns' in order to increase their own probability of winning. A higher level of 'guns' clearly m akes the interaction more destructive than the classical Hirshleifer's basic m odel. Albeit interesting, this note is nothing but a very prelim inary result which has to be considered as a 'spare part' of a further analysis of conflicts.
